Security analysis of homomorphic encryption scheme for cloud computing: Known-plaintext attack

M. Babenko, N. Chervyakov, A. Tchernykh, N. Kucherov, M. Deryabin, G. Radchenko, P.O.A. Navaux, V. Svyatkin

    Publikation: KonferenzbeitragPapierBegutachtung

    Abstract

    We consider cryptosystems for homomorphic encryption schemes based on the Residue Number System (RNS) and Secret Sharing Schemes. One of their disadvantages is that they are directly related to data redundancy, and hence, increasing the size of the storage. To minimize it, homophonic encryption can be combined with the arithmetic coding known as Chinese remainder theorem. We describe a new method of cryptanalysis based on a property of RNS and theory of numbers. We prove that an attacker needs only η · [log2 log2(k · pn)l arbitrary generated input files that form the 'known-plaintext', where pi is moduli RNS, to calculate the secret key required to decrypt the entire data. © 2018 IEEE.
    OriginalspracheEnglisch
    Seiten270-274
    Seitenumfang5
    DOIs
    PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 2018
    Veranstaltung2018 IEEE Conference of Russian Young Researchers in Electrical and Electronic Engineering - St. Petersburg Electrotechnical University “LETI”, St. Petersburg, Russland
    Dauer: 29 Jän. 20181 Feb. 2018

    Konferenz

    Konferenz2018 IEEE Conference of Russian Young Researchers in Electrical and Electronic Engineering
    KurztitelElConRus 2018
    Land/GebietRussland
    OrtSt. Petersburg
    Zeitraum29/01/181/02/18

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